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The Rise and Decline of the Business Roundtable? 
 
Bruce Cronin1 





As the organised voice of the largest corporations in the world’s largest economy, the US Business 
Roundtable has gained notoriety not only for its potential power but also its effectiveness, spurring 
imitators from Canada to Australia and New Zealand. Since its formation in the early 1970s the 
Roundtable has won remarkable legislative victories and built popular support for the notion of what is 
good for business is good for America. Yet at the same time, it has also been adept at compromise and 
retreat, which has led some to suggest its time has passed. With echoes of the passing of the Roman 
Empire, John Jurris (2000) and more recently Mark Mizruchi (2013) have suggested that the very success 
of the Roundtable in winning early victories over labour rights and the reach government regulation 
removed its raison d’etre, winning the battle but losing the war of reshaping the US polity. 
1 I am grateful to Bill Carroll and David Peetz for their detailed and constructive comments on this paper, to David 
Dekker for the lobbying competitiveness metaphor and Larry Su for suggesting the divergence test employed. 
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While arguably representing the narrow interests of a particular group of firms, the Business Roundtable 
meets the criteria for ‘Think Tanks’ presented by Georgina Murray in chapter three of this volume: 
‘permanent persuaders’ providing allegedly non-partisan expert opinion on policy matters in an attempt to 
influence these. While it directly represents the interests of large industrial companies as members, since 
these firms comprise a central part of economic activity the Roundtable’s positions have a potentially 
very wide impact on society. Certainly, it has aimed and succeeded in reframing the political agenda on 
major economic issues. 
Burris (1992) categorises the Roundtable as a ‘moderate-conservative’ lobbying group distinct from the 
‘ultra-conservative’ National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and Chamber of Commerce lobbying 
groups and from ‘moderate-conservative’ research groups such as the Committee for Economic 
Development (CED). Where research groups tend to develop and apply ideological positions to policy 
matters, the Roundtable has been quite pragmatic from the start, pursuing the interests of business in 
general and big business where there is a conflict, but avoiding narrow self-interests of particular 
members. It is distinguished from other interest groups in framing this pragmatism within popular tropes 
and mobilising grass-roots support. 
This direct, pragmatic yet long-run engagement by the CEOs of the largest US industrial companies in 
policy matters meets Gramsci’s definition of ‘organic intellectuals’, engaging not only economically but 
also in social and political arenas: 
The capitalist entrepreneur … already characterised by a certain directive and technical (i.e. 
intellectual capacity) … must be an organiser of masses of men ... an organiser of the 
“confidence” of investors … If not all entrepreneurs, at least an élite among them must have the 
capacity to be an organiser of society in general, including all its complex organism of services, 
right up to the state organism, because of the need to create the conditions most favourable to the 
expansion of their own class … (Gramsci 1971, pp. 5-6). 
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In this chapter I review the rise of the Business Roundtable, examine the organisational methods 
underpinning its success and consider whether it is now in a state of decline. I predominantly employ an 
historical method, drawing on a variety of accounts of the major policy battlegrounds over the last fifty 
years in some detail. I supplement this with a social network analysis of the changing position of the 
Roundtable in the network of Congressional lobbying, utilising a little-used dataset (see Lee and Cronin 
2016 on the value of combining such methods in heterodox research). 
1. Origins  
As meticulously detailed by Linder (2000), the immediate origins of the Business Roundtable lie in the 
corporate mobilization from the late 1960s against the perceived power of unions in general and 
construction unions in particular. But as Domhoff (1983) points out, the organisations that coalesced at 
this time had long roots in the Business Council, the centre of business policy networks since 1933. He 
quotes DuPont chair Irving Shapiro: ‘The Roundtable was created to have an advocacy organization. It 
wasn’t created by the Business Council, but by the same people.’ (Domhoff 1983, p. 135). 
Union power in the construction sector was particularly problematic for industrial firms in the 1960s. 
While many large US manufacturers had responded to rising labour costs by relocating production 
offshore in the 1960s and 70s, construction unions were largely impervious to this as their production was 
inherently localised. Rising construction costs from labour shortages arising from the Vietnam draft 
directly impacted on large US industrial firms when constructing new plant (Linder, 2000). 
Amidst a variety of industry responses to the escalation in construction costs, a key figure was US Steel 
Corporation CEO Roger Blough, who, in a bid to weaken union power, halted construction work on his 
plants in June 1967 to deny alternative employment to workers striking against local contractors. US Steel 
was joined by large local employers Westinghouse and Jones and Laughlin. Chamber president and 
construction firm owner Winston Blount subsequently called for more widespread united employer action 
against construction unions (Linder, 2000). 
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In May 1969, a Construction Users Anti-Inflation Round Table (CUAIR) was established to build 
solidarity among large industrial firms in setting common terms when agreeing construction contracts and 
to find methods to reduce the power of construction to press wage increases. A distinct feature of the 
group, which would also come to characterize the Business Roundtable, was that it solely comprised 
CEOs or chairs of major industrial companies. Roger Blough agreed to chair the CUAIR on the condition 
that member CEOs agreed to personally participate in the policy committee (Linder, 2000). Founding 
participants comprised CEOs or chairs from GE, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Union Carbide, Kennecott 
Copper, GM, and AT&T. Other early participants included Alcoa, Shell, Bechtel, Ebsasco, Procter & 
Gamble, Dow Chemical, B.F. Goodrich, International Paper, Consumers Power, Aluminum Company of 
America, American Electric Power, General Dynamics, Humble Oil, Owens-Corning, Texaco and 
DuPont. 
By 1972 Blough had turned to broader concerns, working with Alcoa CEO John Harper to bring together 
a number of groupings of senior executives agitated by prevailing labour conditions, largely to rationalise 
existing overlapping membership. The CUAIR became the Construction Committee and a ‘Labor Law 
Study Group’ became the Labor Law Committee of the new Business Roundtable – For Responsible 
Labor-Management Relations in October 1972, each with a full-time executive director. The ‘March 
Group’ an informal network of CEOs which had for a long time met at the New York members’ Links 
Club merged in early 1973 (Linder, 2000; Waterhouse, 2014).  
2. Modus Operandi 
A key organising principle of the Business Roundtable is the direct engagement of the CEOs of the 
largest US industrial corporations in its daily activity. Blough’s experience in the sluggish politics of 
business representative organizations and his direct involvement in US Steel’s conflict with construction 
unions proved the need to unite these key decision makers in what many business figures interpreted as an 
existentially defining period. The mobilization of CEOs, in turn, generates direct access to very senior 
levels of government; the Roundtable’s first lobbying activity on formation was a meeting of half of its 
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executive with the White House Budget Director, the Federal Reserve chair and the chair of the Council 
of Economic Advisors (Waterhouse, 2014). 
A second characteristic of the Roundtable is its industrial composition. Members are overwhelmingly 
vertically integrated industrial firms operating in stable regulated markets with few competitors. While 
the particular industries represented shifted with changes in economic structure, pharmaceuticals, 
telecoms and IT in place of engineering, until the late 1990s it remained apart from the finance sector - 
banks, insurance firms - and from investment capitalists throughout, who were caste as a destabilising 
influence on business (Waterhouse, 2014). 
Third, the Roundtable eschews partisan politics in preference for a long-term effort to build support 
across Congress and did not fund PACs or individual candidates, though individual corporates do; John 
Harper (Alcoa) and Irving Shapiro (DuPont) were prominent Democrats, Blough and John Young 
(Hewlett Packard), Republicans (Waterhouse, 2014). Instead, the Roundtable organizes around a set of 
task forces focused on legislative areas deemed to be restricting business; in addition to the labour law 
and construction committees, there were initially task forces on consumerism, taxes, environment and 
trade; these expanded to other topics as the need arose. Each task force was chaired by a CEO with 
administrative support from the CEO’s firm; the Roundtable itself had few administrative staff (9 in 1974; 
11 in 2004), though the expenditure on hired attorneys and lobbyists remained substantial. This was 
funded by membership fees of $2,500 to $35,000 per annum, a total of $1.9 million in 1974, 161 
members paying $10,000 to $35,000 and a total of $3 million by 2004 (Slavin 1975; Domhoff 2006). 
Recent spending on lobbying is reported in Figure 6.1. 
ENTER FIGURE 6.1 AROUND HERE 
Fourth, the Roundtable effectively combines national coalitions of business organisations with grass roots 
mobilisations of their members and their allies and employees at local levels. The Roundtable 
Construction Committee initially continued CUAIC efforts to mobilise local ‘user groups’ in solidarity 
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against local construction unions and in Congressional lobbying. This was extended to employees and 
household consumers in a major employer organisations’ mobilization against the 1977 Labor Law 
Reform Bill which saw an unprecedented wide coalition and the first business use of grassroots lobbying. 
Thereafter, the focus of popular mobilisation was to support specific legislative efforts (Waterhouse, 
2014). 
The Roundtable’s focus, then, is more tactical than the propagation of abstract principles characteristic of 
research-oriented Think Tanks. An early foray into this area, an expensive, public relations campaign in 
the Readers Digest to improving public perceptions of business was quickly dropped when measurable 
impact on public opinion was detected (Waterhouse 2014). The Roundtable maintains a pragmatic 
legislative focus, drawing on the well-honed tactical skills of business competition, deployed and 
developed skills in exploiting the political divisions of the day and framing their goals within universal 
popular concerns ahead of narrow business interests.  
3. Effectiveness 
To assess the effectiveness of the Roundtable’s lobbying activity, a set of major issue areas that the 
Roundtable has engaged in are considered. These cover labour, inflation, consumer protection, regulation, 
taxation, trade and healthcare. 
3.1 Labour 
By Linder’s (2000) account, the Roundtable precursor, the CUAIR had sought to create a ‘united front’ 
among employers to expand supply of skilled labour, avoid overtime, stop local building during local 
strikes and to support local collective bargaining. The organisation gained regular access to senior 
members of the administration but was not effective in effecting government intervention in collective 
bargaining. The CUAIR funded research on non-union contracting and provided and funded legal 
representation for small contractors in labour disputes, rolling back union picketing rights, and formed 
dozens of construction local user groups to build employer solidarity.  
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A key target for employers became union hiring halls.  Contractors depended on hiring halls in order to 
maintain a steady supply of specialist combinations of labour. These were readily unionised, providing an 
organisational focal point with highly skilled and unionised crafts at their core. Attempts to limit union 
power here typically faltered against individual contractors' needs for labour and the alternative costs of 
the complex personnel administration in-house. In January 1971 Blough called for a ‘hard crackdown on 
construction unions’ and advocated use of non-union contractors; a non-union hiring hall was established 
in Houston later in the year.  
The position of unionised contractors declined through the 1970s, their share of domestic contracts falling 
from 69 to 41 percent 1965-75, with non-unionised contractors gaining market geographic share. The 
non-unionised Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC) doubled its membership to 10,000 1972-76, 
accounting for 32 percent of non-residential construction by 1971, and gaining large-scale industrial 
projects from Roundtable firms. In 1970 DuPont, which had previously used unionised contractors, 
awarded three contracts to non-unionised construction firms, in pursuit of lower construction costs. By 
1974 half of DuPont's construction was undertaken by non-unionised firms. In 1973 Shell Oil awarded a 
$12 million contract for a natural gas plant to a non-unionised Houston firm, the first non-union contract 
in highly-unionised Michigan. 
At the same time, uneven supply of skilled workers in complex projects at critical locations and times, 
sustained unionised contractors. Attempts to regularise the supply of skilled labour saw the Nixon 
administration, with support from unionised contractors, introduce training programmes and tripartite 
bargaining in the construction industry to limit local wildcat strikes. The Business Roundtable, now on 
the scene, called for legislation to give national unions control over their local branches but saw the main 
mechanism being increased employer bargaining power through strengthened local contractors 
associations. 
In April 1975, the Ford administration attempted to legislate for larger area bargaining, accompanied by a 
concession to allow secondary picketing of non-union subcontractors. The Roundtable immediately 
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resolved to oppose this, noting the major cost reductions coming from the growing non-union sector. 
They reiterated their preference for local employer solidarity over larger area bargaining that would 
strengthen national unions and spill-over into other industries. Employers mobilized against the extension 
of picketing via a National Right to Work Committee campaign, vigorously supported by Ronald Reagan, 
who was contesting Ford for the Republican presidential candidacy, leading Ford to veto the Bill after 
Congress passed it. When the bill was reintroduced to Congress by the Carter administration in 1977, it 
was decisively defeated, amidst vigorous opposition from the Roundtable and a wide coalition of business 
organisations. By 1984 the Roundtable could report an overall decrease in construction wages by 45 cents 
per hour.  
In summary, Linder (2000, p. 414) argues that ‘the Roundtable was unable to secure enactment of its 
national legislative agenda, but it did thwart the AFL-CIO’s congressional initiatives. Its most important 
accomplishment, undermining unions’ quasi-monopoly of the large-scale industrial construction so vital 
to Roundtable members’ accumulation strategies, was a self-help measure undertaken largely without 
state assistance.’ 
3.2 Inflation 
By Waterhouse’s (2014) account, in a position of relative weakness in the early 1970s, generated by 
labour shortages and spiralling prices driven by the Vietnam War, business had pragmatically called for 
government controls on wages and had supported Nixon’s New Economic Policy from August 1971-73, 
introducing wage and price stabilization. The programme was supported by 70 per cent of public polled 
and publically welcomed by, amongst others, the chairs of GM, Chrysler, Metropolitan Life Assurance, 
Republic Steel, Pan American Airlines. While contested among their membership and qualified as ‘a 
necessary evil’ the NAM and Chamber also supported the programme. But as controls could only 
effectively be short-lived, employers were concerned to strengthen their bargaining position once controls 
were lifted. Accordingly, the Chamber mounted a public relations campaign associating labour power and 
government spending as underpinning causes of price inflation. 
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By contrast, the Roundtable agitated from the start against further government controls on business. The 
CUAIC’s first act following its October 1971 formation was a meeting with senior government officials 
where they made a vigorous call for the immediate cessation of the controls. In Congressional hearings on 
possible extension of controls in 1974, the Roundtable and individual members argued that controls were 
associated with economic decline as they restricted investment.  
The linkage between government spending, union power and inflation, worsened by government was 
deployed tactically in a major mobilization against proposed extended picketing rights in the 1977 Labour 
Law Reform Bill discussed above. The Roundtable, NAM and Chamber sought common cause among 
big and small employers and consumers, who it was  alleged would suffer from enhanced union power. 
Similarly, the three lobbied successfully against the 1978 Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Bill, 
on the grounds that full employment at prevailing union rates would fuel inflation. 
The Roundtable and NAM initially tolerated Carter’s 1978 voluntary wage and price restraint as the price 
of reduced government spending. But as the administration applied more complex wage and price 
guidelines in the face of the 1979 oil price shock, the Roundtable, NAM and National Association of 
Retailers turned against wage and price guidelines in favour of the ‘hard policy choices’ being prompted 
by the accession of Paul Volcker as chairperson to the Federal Reserve and his aggressive 1979-82 
monetary restrictions and the accompanying recession. 
4.3 Consumer protection  
With rising affluence through the 1960s, greater exposure of product failures and sympathetic Democrat 
administrations public support grew for consumer rights beyond caveat emptor, crystallised on 1969 calls 
for a Consumer Protection Agency (CPA). Business organisations mobilized against the perceived state 
encroachment on their decision-making, the Roundtable establishing a Consumer Issues Working Group 
(CWIG) in 1973. Acknowledging widespread popular support for consumer rights legislation, the CWIG 
did not oppose this directly but sought to rally the minority opposition in Congress to delay and amend to 
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limit the effectiveness of proposals. A grass-roots strategy was deployed to lobby the minority congress 
members, asking small business members of the NAM to write to Congress as independent voices. 
Alongside the congressional initiative, the Roundtable led efforts to try to shape public opinion on the 
issue, commissioning a public opinion poll that counterpoised creation of a new, overarching and 
expensive Federal agency against improving the effectiveness of effective agencies. With 75 percent of 
respondents supporting the loaded answer, the poll result was promoted widely and effectively against the 
CPA proposal, while reinforcing the general business position against state encroachment and exploiting 
public distrust of state bureaucracy and paternalisation. When the Bill passed Congress in 1975, Ford, 
under pressure from business-aligned Reagan for the Republican nomination, succumbed to the business 
lobby to veto it. On resubmission under Carter in 1978, sustained business public relations campaigning 
against big government dissuaded congressional support (Waterhouse, 2014). 
3.4 Regulation 
By the late 1970s, the Roundtable had succeeded in weakening union and consumer protection rights, 
defeating price controls and committing successive administrations to reducing government spending.  
They had done this with considerable tactical nous in building wide coalitions exploiting the political 
divisions of the day in Congress but framing each targeted issue as part of a burden on business efficiency 
that was economically detrimental to the public as consumers. On this basis they turned their attention 
towards a more comprehensive reduction in government regulation of business. 
A precursor to the push for regulatory reform was the industrial deregulation of the Carter administration. 
Regulation of airlines, trucking and telecommunications had been established in the Progressive and New 
Deal eras to protect firms from excessive competition (Coase 1959; Kolko 1963). But by the 1970s a 
sufficiently complex set of imperfections, market and price restrictions, capacity and expansion 
limitations had developed that the incumbent firms welcomed change, though were highly divided in their 
response to specific proposals. Consequently, the national business organisations, including the 
Roundtable, who typically represented both winners and losers from specific deregulation proposals had 
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discussed the need for regulatory reform for many years without consensus and thus were not highly 
motivated to mobilise to resist change (Derthick & Quirk 1985). 
While quiet on deregulation, the Roundtable was a vocal opponent of any new regulation without strong 
cause. As part of his anti-inflation policy, Ford accepted the view that government regulation often 
generated hidden costs and mandated a cost-benefit analysis for all new government regulations. The 
Roundtable quickly established a regulation task force under Irving Shapiro (DuPont) to collect a mass of 
examples of ‘harmful or unnecessary’ regulations from members and estimates of their cost. They then 
used these examples to lobby for legislation for comprehensive regulatory reform (Waterhouse 2014). 
However, Waterhouse (2014) argues the Roundtable made two tactical mistakes in promoting the 
legislation. First it pressed for a clause removing the presumption that a proposed regulation was valid 
unless proved otherwise. Second, it opposed a proposal requiring regulatory agencies to provide small 
firms with regulatory exemptions and flexibility in application. These proposals weakened unity within 
the coalition of large and small businesses and strengthened the resolve of their opponents, leading Carter 
to drop comprehensive reform in favour of a small business-focused Regulatory Flexibility Act, without 
mandated cost-benefit analysis.  
Reagan’s 1981 election provided a fillip to the pursuit of regulatory reform, with a new executive order 
requiring cost-benefit analysis of existing regulations where compliance costs exceeded $100 million and 
the creation of a Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief. The task force asked the Roundtable to 
identify the ten regulations that could be changed to greatest benefit and then opened itself up to take 
complaints of regulatory burden from businesses. Efforts to resubmit comprehensive regulatory reform 
through the Democratic-controlled House were unsuccessful, but presidential regulatory review under 
Reagan saw regulatory capacity diminished by the widespread appointment of anti-regulation advocates 
to head regulatory agencies (Waterhouse 2014). 
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3.5 Fiscal policy  
By Waterhouse’s (2014) account, the government deficit was seen by the Roundtable not only as a driver 
of inflation (deficit spending detached from productivity growth) but also as crowding out funds for 
business investment. Because the government was borrowing to finance the deficit, firms had to pay 
higher rates to borrow capital for investment. Thus the government deficit undermined the ability of firms 
to invest to modernize plant, increase productivity and develop their competitiveness against growing 
foreign exports. Further, as Roundtable taxation task force chair and GE CEO, Reginald Jones argued in 
1975, not only did government fiscal policy make it expensive to raise capital externally, tax policies 
made it difficult to fund investment from retained earnings. 
The Roundtable pursued an acceleration of the depreciation rate allowed as a tax deduction. Since 1934 
firms had been allowed to deduct the cost of wear and tear on plant and equipment from the amount liable 
to pay tax on.  Governments had periodically shortened or increased the period of wear and tear deemed 
needed before replacement in order to encourage or discourage capital investment. The Roundtable 
argued that the economic difficulties of the 1970s demanded increased capital investment and advocated a 
reduction in the capital replacement period (depreciation rate). The proposal was supported by a lobbying 
mobilization by the Roundtable, NAM, Chamber, and a range of trade associations, reframing the desire 
for tax relief as a contribution to national competitiveness and economic growth. 
But while reduced capital depreciation periods were valuable to the large capital-intensive industrial firms 
at the heart of the Roundtable, smaller firms with lower capital expenditure were more interested in lower 
interest rates and reductions to the gross rate of corporation tax. Tax reduction campaigns had spread 
since the success of a 1978 referendum on the issue in California. This ‘supply side’ movement advocated 
a general reduction in taxation, and business taxation in particular, to provide more incentives for 
entrepreneurial activity and competition as a driver of productivity. 
Reagan’s election embraced the latter generalized tax cut policy, which he incorporated alongside $140 
billion government spending cuts in the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Bill. This, together with 
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reductions in regulation and stable monetary policy, were sufficient to bring a broad sway of business 
leaders, including the Roundtable to support the new policy regime. When reduced depreciation rates 
were included, the Roundtable assembled the usual coalition and grassroots mobilization to support the 
Bill, overwhelming the Democrat-controlled house. 
But the Act did not survive the severe recession the Reagan administration immediately faced, providing 
little scope for the proposed spending cuts yet the tax cuts opening up the deficit and increasing pressure 
on interest rates. In a bid to reduce the deficit and increase the availability of capital for investment, in 
mid-1982 the Roundtable called for a closing of the deficit by a reversal of the tax cuts, albeit retaining 
the lower headline marginal rates. But this broke the coalition with the Chamber and other trade 
associations of smaller firms who valued the tax cuts much more and divided the Roundtable itself, with 
less capital-intensive firms less committed to the deficit reduction goal (Ehrbar 1982). Taxes were 
subsequently substantially increased by the administration in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 but this 
was mainly through reductions in corporate allowances, including a third of the depreciation allowance 
(Martin 1991; Waterhouse 2014). 
In 1983, amidst recession and a renewed rising government deficit   the Roundtable established a budget 
task force chaired by Cigna Insurance CEO Robert Kilpatrick who launched a campaign to restrain 
government spending.  In 1985 the Roundtable organized a nationwide letter-writing campaign among 
their employees, mobilizing a million around a call to ‘Halt the Deficit’, involving cuts to defence and 
social security. But unusually untuned to public sentiment and the fine lines of political divisions, and 
with divisions on the issue within the Roundtable and among other business associations, the campaign 
failed to win over the House Democrats. Instead, with Democrat support, the administration reduced the 
corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent but removed $100 billion annual tax exemptions. 
Only Bush’s 1990 deal with the Democrats to combine spending cuts with increases in marginal tax rates 
made inroads into the budget deficit, a deal advocated by the Roundtable and NAM with wide support 
from major CEOs over Chamber and NFIB opposition (Mizruchi 2013; Waterhouse 2014). Having lost 
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tax cuts under Bush I and maintained by the Clinton administration, the Republicans were insistent on 
reversing these under Bush II, who would not entertain cuts to business taxation until personal tax cuts 
were enacted. The Roundtable and NAM agreed to this and were subsequently rewarded with cuts to 
capital gains and dividends and accelerated depreciation allowances (Mizruchi 2013), their priorities for 
economic growth tied to the 2002-03 WTO negotiations.  
3.6 Trade 
The Roundtable had opposed NAM and Chamber proposals in the early 1980s for an industrial 
revitalization programme as overly statist and misrepresenting the state of US competitiveness. Instead, 
the Roundtable, via its trade taskforce under Lee Morgan (Caterpillar), advocated free-trade agreements 
to allow US firms to compete on a larger international scale. The Roundtable joined with the Round Table 
of European Industrialists in 1987 to advocate a WTO in place of the GATT, and with the Canadian 
Business Council on National Issues for a US-Canadian free trade agreement. Roundtable member Edson 
Spencer (Honeywell) argued that an expansion of international trade and investment would stimulate US 
industry. Prominent Roundtable firms led the US-NAFTA coalition, undertaking state-level public 
relations campaigns, eventually winning the Clinton Democrats to the policy, albeit with qualified side 
agreements on labour and environmental standards. 
In accounts of the Roundtable’s legislative programme, little attention has been given to the 
organisation’s efforts to secure liberalisation of international trade and investment, perhaps taking this for 
granted and seeing little conflict at stake. But as Milner (1988) has emphasised, the shift towards free 
trade was initially bitterly opposed by less competitive industrial sectors. For the most competitive 
industrial sectors, that the Roundtable tended to represent, liberalisation of international trade and 
investment was a major prize. 
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3.7 Health care reform 
By Judis’ (1995) account, in the face of rapidly rising health insurance costs, the Business Roundtable 
advocated systematic reform against Reagan proposals to deregulate healthcare. The Roundtable, via 
Xerox and the big steel firms, engaged with the 1986 National Leadership Commission on Health, which 
recommended universal reform. In 1991 this group of big employers proposed that businesses that did not 
pay insurance be taxed to cover the uninsured, thus reducing the overall cost, a proposal endorsed by the 
Chamber in 1993. 
When the Clinton administration moved to enact this proposal the Roundtable, National Association of 
Manufacturers  and the Chamber initially supported it. But a coalition of small business organisations, 
health insurers, drug companies and conservative media mobilized to turn public opinion and the peak 
organisations against any mandatory health insurance. This would allow small businesses to continue to 
avoid contributions to insurance premiums or taxes and prevent the capping or regulation of premiums 
paid to insurance firms or prices paid for drugs or healthcare. 
Noting that public support for the detail of the Health reform rested on trusting the President, 
Conservative media, centred on The American Spectator, mounted an unrelenting campaign to undermine 
the credibility of Clinton's past personal and business dealings.  In six months, public support for the plan 
fell from 59 to 46 percent. Amidst this growing public uncertainty, the Chamber came under pressure 
from large members that did not provide insurance, including Pepsico, General Mills and Woolworths. 
Meanwhile the National American Wholesale Grocers' Association resigned from the coalition and many 
small members defected to the National Federation of Independent Business that was campaigning 
against reform. Within the Business Roundtable, opposition was mobilised within its Health, Welfare and 
Retirement Task Force, chaired by the CEO of Prudential Insurance, and including eighteen firms either 
in health or did not insure their workers. This group eventually convinced the Roundtable to oppose the 
plan and the NAM and the Chamber then followed. 
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Through the Bush II administration, the Roundtable continued to press for reduced health insurance costs, 
the major cost item for large employers. Immediately after Obama’s election in 2008, the Roundtable, the 
NFIB, America’s Health Insurance Plan (AHIP), and the American Association of Retired Persons 
advocated universal insurance to spread the costs of health care. The Roundtable eventually supported 
Obama’s capping costs of treatment, despite reservations that they would have to fund the shortfall for 
their employees. The AHIP, Chamber and NFIB opposed yet were defeated (Mizruchi 2013). 
Judis (1995, p. 13) sees health care reform as an example of ‘American business [lacking] the kind of 
farseeing leaders who have the intelligence, objectivity, and authority to unite it around its long-term 
interests.’ But it can also be interpreted as tactical manoeuvring to reconcile a range of diverse business 
interests, and a pragmatic response to the outcome. 
3.8  Evaluation 
The case studies suggest that the Roundtable’s modus operandi repeatedly secured legislative success. In 
each case a specialised task force was established to develop detailed proposals attuned to the political 
landscape of the day. This then brokered coalitions with a wide range of other business organisations, 
with differing interests and policy objectives, to unite on the specific proposal. Congress and the 
administration were systematically lobbied from a wide range of organisations, reinforced by grassroots 
mobilisation of individual members and their employees to build up a groundswell of public opinion in 
support of the proposal. In these mobilisations the proposals were carefully framed within a popular trope, 
such as opposition to rising prices, taxation or big government. 
Table 6.1 summarises the outcomes of the cases discussed. The historical evidence suggests that in all but 
two of the policy areas the Roundtable achieved its goals of preventing further encroachments of state 
regulation and in reframing the policy debate. In the case of fiscal policy, it initially won tax and deficit 
reductions but saw these later reversed. In the case of health care reform, it stalled the changes it opposed 
and eventually found a compromise. But the great gains in rolling back labour rights and inflation in the 
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1970-80s and international trade and investment in the 1980s-90s, undoubtedly outweighed the qualified 
outcomes elsewhere, for these were viewed as existential issues for business. 
ENTER TABLE 6.1 AROUND HERE 
4. Decline? 
The early rapid gains of the Roundtable against organised labour in the 1970s are often counterpoised to 
the more mixed results of the 1980s and the complex and at times paralysed policy environment that 
followed. If the Roundtable’s early success is attributable to its composition as the powerful commanding 
heights of the economy, why has this power not created continued and unchecked dominance of the 
policy agenda since? 
Two arguments are commonly advanced to explain this paradox, fragmentation and it’s being the victim 
of its success. The fragmentation thesis is that structural changes in the economy associated with 
globalisation and technical change have undermined the industries in which the Roundtable has been 
rooted and thus its economic power and political influence; it has struggled to respond to the changing 
environment. The victims of success thesis is that the sophisticated tactics and overwhelming resources 
invested in lobbying that enabled the early policy gains have overwhelmed the political system, 
paralysing effective decision making and consensus formation, leading to outcomes against the interests 
of the dominant participants. 
These arguments will be evaluated in their own terms and in the light of the case studies presented then 
considered in the light of an empirical analysis of the Roundtable’s position in the structure of lobbying 
activity over time. 
4.1 The fragmentation thesis  
Waterhouse (2014) points to a generational shift in the Roundtable in the early 1980s as foundational 
‘charismatic’ leaders retired and a weakening of the industrial sector in the structure of the US economy 
and thus a decline in its influence. Mizruchi (2013) argues that this reflected increased expectations of 
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shareholder value maximisation among Fortune 500 firms, whose average CEO tenure fell from 9.7 years 
in 1982 to 6.8 years 2002. The weakening social cohesion amongst the economic elite from increased 
turnover was reinforced by a decline in director interlocking among firms, as board membership 
diversified with internationalisation and director workload increased with new obligations under the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act. Average interlocks among SP1500 firms falling from 7.14 to 4.98 2000-2010 (Chu 
& Davis 2011).  
In terms of structural change, a new business lobby, the American Business Conference, was established 
in 1981 to represent the rapidly growing risk-oriented mid-sized finance and high-tech service sectors, 
gaining the ear of the Reagan administration and winning reductions in capital gains taxes and weakening 
of financial regulation. The ‘big three’ (NAM, Chamber and Roundtable) had with the addition of the 
ABC and the NFIB become the ‘big five’ Waterhouse (2014). Jeffrey Bimbaum (1997) compared the 
Roundtable to, ‘a vacuum-tube operation struggling to survive in a digital age’, its members ‘too busy 
restructuring, reengineering, merging or acquiring to dabble in public policy’ (cited by Linder 2000, p. 
210). 
But while these structural changes are said to have undermined the position of the Roundtable as a 
cohesive central coordinating force, the Roundtable readily accommodated the structural changes to the 
economy, recruiting the CEOs of the major firms in the new industries. In 1988, the Roundtable 
leadership was drawn from these industries; Pfizer, Aetna, American Express and IBM, while major firms 
in rising industries such as IT (Microsoft, Yahoo) and retail (Walmart, Target) continued to join the 
Roundtable (Waterhouse 2014). Director interlocks may be an important force for corporate cohesion, 
though the evidence is mixed and there may be other mechanisms (Mizruchi 1996). 
4.2 Victim of success thesis  
Judis (2000) argues that the success of the business offensive against state regulation has been its undoing 
as the excessive short-term self-interest has stymied the political and institutional balance of interests 
necessary for the pursuit of a common good that provides long-term benefits for business. He argues that 
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underpinning the great periods of US economic and social progress, the Progressive Era, the New Deal 
and the 1960s, were political-institutional combinations of strong public-spirited contest among political 
parties, an independent public service responsive to the balance among contesting interest groups and a 
non-partisan moderate policy elite organizations with vision of the common good. But by the 1990s 
political contest had become extremely partisan and deadlocked, the public service politicized, business 
investments in lobbyists outweighed the capacity of countervailing interests, and there was no willingness 
in elite circles to attempt to forge a non-partisan vision in the face of partisan hostility. 
Mizruchi (2013) draws on this view, arguing that the victories of the conservative business elite 
consolidated by Reagan in the early 1980s removed the principal constraints on business – labour and 
government regulation – but in so doing removed the drivers of business unity. Banks, which through a 
central role in the interlocking director network through the post-war era, had turned their attention to 
financial services and investment and no longer mediated sectional conflicts within the corporate elite. 
Mizruchi offers two cases to support his view that class-wide elite cohesion has been broken, one 
concerning fiscal policy and the other healthcare.  In the case of fiscal policy, he argues that the 1986 tax 
defeat led the Roundtable to retreat and then abandon efforts to resist Republican Tax cuts thereafter. 
With this abdication, no moderate public service oriented policy elite organisation remained to provide 
elite cohesion, as the National Civic Federation and the Council for Economic Development (CED) had in 
the past. Likewise, with healthcare, self-interested divisions within business delayed and threatened to 
destroy a healthcare reform package that would have reduced the costs of all participants, including 
business. 
Judis’ (2000) analysis of despair for a lost liberal democratic equilibrium amounts to a moral exhortation, 
a call for a courageous educated elite to put aside short-term self-interest in favour of the long-term 
common good and to redesign institutions to better resist partisan capture. Yet the rise and decline of the 
great epochs of US progress can as readily, and more convincingly, be interpreted within a Gramscian 
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framework. From this perspective, the Roundtable is engaged in an ongoing war of position, building 
coalitions and advancing and retreating tactically as necessary to maintain its hegemony. 
The case studies illustrate the Roundtable acting constantly as a hegemon with mixed tactical success. 
Very successful in the 1970s, challenges in the 1980s but very successful in arguably the most important 
arena – international trade and investment. Mizruchi’s (2013) tax case needs to be interpreted in the larger 
context of the expanding trade and investment context. The tax deductions defeat of 1996 was followed 
by tactical success in reducing the deficit via marginal tax rises and spending cuts under Bush I and 
Clinton. The acceptance of a deficit and support for tax reductions with Bush II was not an abdication of 
principle but an act of pragmatic, tactical advance. Likewise, in healthcare, the Roundtable attempted to 
find legislative outcomes that would meet the needs of most of the varying business interests, and 
ultimately succeeded with its support for Obama care; this is characteristic of a hegemon, accommodating 
varying interests, not an expression of narrow self-interest. 
4.3 Hegemonic position 
The activity of the Roundtable as a hegemon, building tactical coalitions framed in terms of broad popular 
interest, is likely to see it centrally connected to other organisations in the policy environment. Building 
on some historical evidence discussed above, this section provides a systematic analysis of this 
proposition, employing a social network analysis of US lobbying activity. 
Network analysis has previously identified the central position of the Roundtable among business 
organisations. In an informal analysis of the executive committees of ten business-planning groups, Burch 
(1983) found the Business Council to be the most central of these organisations, alongside the 
Roundtable, CED, Council of Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission. Burris (1992) in a more 
systematic and formal network analysis found the Roundtable, in particular, together with the Business 
Council, Conference Board and the Council of Foreign Relations as the most central organisations. More 
recently, Strangfeld (2006) found Roundtable member firms became more central in the interlocking 
director network among energy firms in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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The analysis in this chapter makes use of quarterly returns made by registered lobbyists in accordance 
with the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act (Office of the Clerk of the US House of Representatives 2016). 
Where traditional social network analyses of director interlocks simply infers corporate cohesion (Cronin 
2011), this approach offers direct evidence of the joint representational activity of business organisations. 
The data for this analysis comprise the quarterly returns of all registered lobbyists, detailing their 
representations to government entities during the period, for 68 quarters from the start of electronic 
archiving in 1999 and the end of 2015, 2 million observations.  
The data from each quarterly register were modelled as an advocacy network, comprising directional ties 
from registered lobbyists to government entities; multiple representations of a lobbyist to the same 
government entity during the quarter were modelled as multiple ties. An example of an advocacy 
network, from the third quarter in 1999, is presented in Figure 6.2. The network was visualised using a 
spring-embedded algorithm with default settings from a Gower scaling in Netdraw 2.154 (Borgatti 2002). 
The circles are registered lobbyists, node size reflecting the number of representations registered in the 
quarter (their outdegree). The squares are the government entities being lobbied, their size reflecting the 
number of representations made to them during the quarter (their indegree). The arrows from one node to 
another indicate representations from lobbyist to government entity registered during the quarter. Nodes 
located towards the centre of the visualisation are more central to the lobbying activity. 
ENTER FIGURE 6.2 AROUND HERE 
 
Lobbying activity in this example is centred on the Senate and House of Representatives from a large 
mass of lobbyists. On the right is an array of the major economic departments, Treasury, Transport, 
Environmental Protection and Defense. Between these two poles of government lies a set of highly active 
lobbyists. These include peak trade associations, such as the Chamber and NAM; specialist lobbying 
firms; large individual corporations, such as IBM and GE, and the Roundtable. 
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The social network analytics underpinning this visualisation provide some precision in the identification 
of influential positions in the network, beyond a simple count of the number of representations (indegree 
or outdegree centrality). For example a node’s degree centrality can be weighted by the degree of the 
nodes it is connected to, to highlight nodes that are connected to more highly connected nodes (a metric 
known as eigenvector centrality). Closeness centrality highlights those nodes that have the shortest paths 
to all other nodes in the network. Betweenness centrality highlights nodes that are commonly on the 
shortest paths to each pair of nodes in the network, a measure of brokerage (see Cronin 2016 and Borgatti, 
Everett & Johnson 2013 for accessible elaborations). 
To evaluate the position of the Roundtable in the network of organisations in the policy environment, 
these common measures of network centrality were calculated for each registered lobbyist, each quarter. 
But these measures only make sense when nodes of the same type are considered. Two different types of 
organisations are evident in a combined network in Figure 6.2 – lobbyists and government entities, that is, 
a two-mode network. The act of lobbying is of a different quality to the act of being lobbied and while the 
data documents common behaviour among lobbyists, there is only partial information on the behaviour of 
those being lobbied, particularly their own interactions. So, in order to carry out the centrality analysis the 
network of lobbying activity alone needs to be extracted. The one-mode network of lobbyists can be 
extracted from the two-mode data by projecting a relationship between two lobbyists where they lobby 
the same government entity. So, where the Roundtable and the Business Council lobby Senate in the 
same quarter, a tie between the Roundtable and Business Council is projected. The subsequent centrality 
analysis then effectively models the relative competitiveness of each lobbyist in the lobbying activity. 
The longitudinal dataset allows the measurement of the evolution of the competitiveness of lobbyists over 
time. To consider the position of the Roundtable within the policy environment during this period, the 
various dimensions of centrality were compared to the mean centrality of all lobbyists over time. A linear 
regression with an interactive variable was then undertaken to determine whether the trend in the 
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Roundtable’s position diverged from the mean trend during the period. In the regression equation (1), 
divergence is given by the magnitude and significance of the coefficient β2. 
Y  = α1 + β1X + α2D + β2XD + μ   (1) 
where:  
Y is the centrality metric 
X is the quarter 
D is a dummy representing the two groups (Roundtable or not) 
 
Metrics were calculated with the igraph package in R. Degree and betweenness centrality were 
normalised by adjusting for the total nodes in each network. Eigenvector and closeness centrality 
were normalised on a 0-1 scale. Betweenness was estimated betweenness with a cut-off of 6 
steps. 126 observations and 2 degrees of freedom in each regression. 
As shown in Table 6.2, all regression models fitted and accounted for much of the variation in 
the data. Roundtable centrality significantly diverged from the mean trend in the case of 
eigenvector centrality and converged towards the mean from a below-mean position in the case 
of betweenness centrality. There was no significant divergence from the mean trend for 
outdegree centrality or closeness centrality, while the intermediating role of the Roundtable in 
terms of all actors increased. This demonstrates that while the Roundtable did not increase the 
number of representations to government more than the mean during the period (outdegree), it 
was increasingly making representations in a manner similar to the most connected lobbyists 
(eigenvector centrality), that is, it was becoming more central among the most central lobbyists 
and becoming more of an intermediary. 
 




This review of the major business policy battlegrounds of the last fifty years indicates that reports of the 
decline of the Roundtable are greatly exaggerated. The organisation remains a powerful think tank with 
an effective modus operandi. The lean central organisation and direct engagement of the CEOs of the 
major US industrial corporations in its policy and implementation sees its strategy and tactics being honed 
by those at the forefront of capitalist competition and cooperation. These CEOs are highly focused on 
making a difference – identifying scope for value added and pursuing it vigorously. The heightened 
strategic and tactical sense translates readily into the policy arena, eschewing partisan ideology for 
pragmatic, tactically astute, legislative lobbying, with clear ability to build coalitions and to frame the 
specific goals within broad, popular themes in the polity. 
While critics may yearn for a policy environment that is more accommodating of the broad range of 
social actors, such as labour and government, this does not mean the US polity is lacking hegemonic 
players. The Roundtable has proved itself to be a hegemon in the Gramscian sense, achieving specific 
goals by building effective coalitions. For a hegemon, tactical gains and losses occur within a longer-term 
war of position.  
The persistence of the Roundtable and its effective modus operandi indicates that the forces of elite 
cohesion are wider than those formed by the interlocking personnel between organisations. It has been 
able to accommodate new powerful organisational entities that have emerged with changes to the 
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Figure 6.1. Business Roundtable – Registered annual expenditure on lobbying 1998-2015 
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Table 6.1. Outcomes of Roundtable policy advocacy 
Policy Area Outcome 
Labour rights Stalled, reframed; won extra-legislatively 
Inflation  Reframed, won 
Consumer protection Reframed , stalled 
Regulation Reframed, stalled 
Fiscal policy Reframed, initially won, lost, sidelined 
Free trade and investment  Reframed, won 




Table 6.2. Business Roundtable relative centrality 1999-2015 
Centrality metric Mean Roundtable Divergence  (β2) Adj R2   
Outdegree  0.916118 0.956491   .0002652  0.1231 **  
Eigenvector  0.03313 0.080531   .0008937 ** 0.3766 ***  
Closeness  0.361674 0.319951 - .0000521  0.3971 ***  
Betweenness  0.0008093 0.0000915   .0000428 ** 0.2002 ***  
*** p < .001; ** p < 0.01 
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